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tion 5 (a). It is submitted that pre-hearing conferences, such as
is the practice in federal courts, would serve this end. 14 In a prehearing conference the contested issues would be isolated and
thus the introduction and discussion of much of the voluminous
technical data ordinarily considered in a Federal Power Commission hearing would be eliminated. Such conferences would put
buyers more on a par with sellers with respect to the all-important duration of the period of delay in effecting needed rate
changes.
Philip E. Henderson

OBLIGATIONS -

INSURER'S CAUSE OF ACTION AND LEGAL SUBROGATION

CONVENTIONAL

Plaintiff insurance company paid insured the amount of
property damage sustained by his vehicle (minus the deductible
portion) in a collision with defendant, and sued the latter for
recovery of the amount paid under the policy. The insured at the
time of payment gave to the plaintiff a written subrogation, but
later apparently made a settlement with defendant and gave him
a general rather than a restricted release.' The district court
overruled an exception of no cause of action and excluded the
purported release from evidence. On appeal by defendant to the
Orleans Court of Appeal, held, affirmed. The loss an insurance
company sustains under an insurance policy may be recovered in
a personal action brought by the insurer against the tortfeasor
under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315,2 and because of this
separate cause of action, a release of the tortfeasor has no effect. American Bankers Insurance Company of Floridav. Costa,
107 So.2d 76 (La. App. 1958).
The legal basis on which an insurance company may recover
from the tortfeasor for claims paid to an insured has been the
14. Such conferences are presently allowed to the Commission according to FPC
regulations. See 18 C.F.R. § 1.18 (1949). The Commission need only employ the
tools at hand. See Bond, The Use of Pre-Trial Technique in Administrative Hearings, 13 F.C.C. BAR J. 55 (1953).
1. A general release will destroy the whole claim. On the other hand, a restricted release will only settle a portion of the claim.
2. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it. .. ."
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subject of much discussion in Louisiana." In an early case 4 the
Supreme Court held in reference to fire insurance that an insurer
could not recover in the absence of a conventional subrogation. 5

Although by virtue of the insurance contract the insurer in such
a case appears to be bound with the tortfeasor to pay for the loss
and consequently has an interest in discharging the claim, the

court seems to have assumed that legal subrogation 6 would not
occur. Although originally unrelated to insurance, the Workmen's Compensation Act of 19147 provided that an employer on
paying an employee's claim is subrogated to the latter's cause of
action. However, the act made no mention of subrogation in
favor of an insurer. This provision was interpreted as not allowing an insurer a cause of action in the absence of a conventional subrogation, 8 but in London, Guarantee & Accident Ins.
Co. v. Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co.,9 a workmen's compensation case,
the court found a cause of action for the insurer under Article
2315. The Workmen's Compensation Act was later amended to
allow the insurer to sue upon the employee's claim.' 0 However,
the courts of appeal related the London rule to general insurance
cases and said that the insurer has an independent cause of
action against the tortfeasor by virtue of Article 2315.11 On the
3. For discussion as to who is the proper party plaintiff to bring the action,
see 1 MCMAiON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 11-12 (1939) ; Comment, 312 INs. L.J. 15
(1949) ; Comment, 13 TUL. L. REV. 382 (1939). The Proposed Code of Practice
should resolve the question of the proper party plaintiff. See PROJET, LOUISIANA
CODE OF PRACTICE, bk. I, tit. III, c. 2, art. 25: "An incorporeal right to which a
person has been subrogated, either conventionally or by effect of law, shall be enforced judicially by: (1) the subrogor and the subrogee, when the subrogation
is partial; or (2) the subrogee, when the entire right is subrogated."
4. D. R. Carroll & Co. v. New Orleans, J. & G.N. R.R., 26 La. Ann. 447
(1874).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2160 (1870) : "The subrogation is conventional: (1)
When the creditor, receiving his payment from a third person, subrogates him in
his rights, actions, privileges, and mortgages against the debtor; this subrogation
must be expressed and made at the same time as payment."
6. Id. art. 2161: "Subrogation takes place of right: . . . (3) For the benefit
of him who, being bound with others, or for others, for the payment of the debt,,
had an interest in discharging it."
7. La. Acts 1914, No. 20, now incorporated into LA. R.S. 23:1162 (1950).
8. Bouchon v. Southern Surety Co., 151 La. 503, 91 So. 854 (1922).
9. 153 La. 287, 95 So. 771 (1923).
10. La. Acts 1926, No. 85, now LA. R.S. 23:1162 (1950).
11. Lumber Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Kemp, 102 So.2d 248 (La. App. 1958) (no
conventional subrogation) ; Lumbermen's Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, 77 So.2d 84
(La. App. 1954) (conventional subrogation not properly entered into evidence,
but was not needed for action under Article 2315). See Universal Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Manisalco, 148 So. 731 (La. App. 1933) (conventional subrogation found
valid, but court also recognized action under Article 2315) ; Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Carpenter, 125 So. 504 (La. App. 1929) (could also use Article 2315).
But see John M. Walton, Inc. v. McManus, 67 So.2d 130 (La. App. 1953) (court
erroneously said right of subrogation existed by virtue of Article 2315) ; Hansen
v. Hickenbotham, 61 So.2d 620 (La. App. 1952). In support of the proposition,
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and Louisiana, 3 with the ex-

ception of the Louisiana cases which give the insurer a separate
action, refuse to recognize the contention that the tortfeasor is
liable to another merely because the injured person was under a
contract with the other. In a recent case the Supreme Court
said: "It is a basic principle of law that a tort-feasor is responsible only for the direct and proximate result of his acts and that,
where a third person suffers damage by reason of a contractual
obligation to the injured party, such damage is too remote and
indirect to become the subject of a direct action ex delicto, in
the absence of subrogation." 14 Several other Louisiana Supreme
Court decisions give support to this premise and have found the
reasoning of the earlier cases following the London rule unsound. 15 In addition, the authorities at common law agree that
the insurer cannot recover in a separate action against the
wrongdoer, but must follow the doctrine of subrogation to the
insured's cause of action.' 6
see Comment, 312 INS. L.J. 15 (1949); MAYER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
IN LOUISIANA 40 (1937).
12. Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903) (defendant broke
machinery of another who furnished plaintiff with power) ; Thompson v. Seaboard
Air Line R.R., 165 N.C. 377, 81 S.E. 315 (1914) (destroyed goods plaintiff had
contracted to buy) ; Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio App.
1946) (negligent damage of a plant deprived workmen of employment, no recovery) ; Pure Oil Co. v. Boyle, 26 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Com. App. 1930) (tortfeasor
polluted stream from which a city supplied water to the plaintiff). See 1 HARPER
& JAMES, TORTS § 6.10 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 106 (2d ed. 1955).
13. Marquette Casualty Co. v. Brown, 235 La. 245, 103 So.2d 269 (1958)
Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transportation Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So.2d 228 (1957)
Board of Comm'rs of Port of New Orleans v. New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 65 So.2d
313 (1953) ; Foret v. Board of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 169 La. 427, 125
So. 437 (1929). See Comment, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 63, 67 (1958).
14. Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transp. Co., 231 La. 953, 961, 93 So.2d 228,
230 (1957) (highway contractor who repaired damage to bridge from overloaded
truck sued truck owner, bridge belonged to state).
15. "[W]e found the views expressed in the London, Guarantee & Accident Ins.
Co. case to be in discord with the basic principle of law that a tortfeasor is responsible only for the direct and proximate results of his acts." Marquette Casualty Co. v. Brown, 235 La. 245, 249, 103 So.2d 269, 271 (1958). See also Board
of Comm'rs of Port of New Orleans v. New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 65 So.2d 313
(1953) ; Foret v. Board of Levee Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 169 La. 427,
125 So. 437 (1929) (employee of firm which was damaged by state releasing flood
waters sued state for salary lost because of the water).
16. Standard Ins. Co. v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 186 F.2d 44 (10th Cir.
1950) (insurer could recover only on right of insured) ; Insurance Company of
North America v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R., 229 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1956) ;
Leavitt v. Canadian Pac. R.R., 90 Me. 153, 37 Atl. 886 (1897) ; Rohm & H. Co. v.
Lessner, 168 Pa. Super. 242, 77 A.2d 675 (1951) (right of insurer to sue derived
from insured). See also 7 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE 6678 (1928) :"The principle on which an insurer is permitted to recover against one whose wrongful act
has caused the loss is not based on the theory of a direct legal right of the insurer
against the wrongdoer, . . . but on the doctrine of subrogation"; PROSSER, TORTS

§ 160 (2d ed. 1955)

(any remedy of insurance company is through subrogation).
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In the instant case the court of appeal applied the theory that
the insurance company has a separate cause of action against
the tortfeasor and held that the insured has no power to release
the wrongdoer from this liability to the insurer. Subrogation
was found unnecessary. Apparently this is the first case where
a court of appeal has applied the independent cause of action
doctrine to a release, and to this extent the doctrine is extended.
It is suggested that the instant case and the line of jurisprudence which it follows are unsound. The undesirable effects of
such a theory holding an independent cause of action have been
recognized by the courts. It has been observed that if there is
.a separate cause of action, there must necessarily follow that
there is a double exposure. 1 7 In addition, it seems that under a
strict application of the principle the personal defenses the tortfeasor has against the insured would not apply to an insurer
suing directly. For example, the tortfeasor's defense of contributory negligence might not be a bar to an insurer suing the
wrongdoer directly because the insurance company would be
proceeding with its own cause of action-not that of the insured. The amount recoverable under the separate action doctrine would seem to be the full loss that the insurer has suffered,
i.e., the total payment made. Under subrogation, however, the
amount recoverable by an insurer is the lesser of (1) that which
the insured could have recovered,' 8 or (2) that which the insurance company paid.' 9 Under the separate action doctrine a release given to the wrongdoer at any time would seem to be ineffective. On the other hand, a release is generally binding in a
subrogation situation even where no notice is given. 20 It appears,
17. Board of Comm'rs of Port of New Orleans v. New Orleans, 223 La. 199,
65 So.2d 313 (1953). For example, the insured could settle with the tortfeasor,
be later paid by the insurer, and the insurer could still, under the theory of Article
2315, sue the tortfeasor.
18. Northwestern Mut. Fire Assoc. v. Allain, 226 La. 788, 77 So.2d 395 (1954)
(recovery computed on what insured could collect in a suit); Charter Oak Fire
Ins. Co. v. Succession of Leone, 54 So.2d 840 (La. App. 1951) (company paid
$1,500, recovery limited to $75); Potomac Ins. Co. v. Blaise, 181 So. 629 (La.
App. 1938) (theft insurer paid value of car stolen, car recovered and repaired
and insurer entitled to recover from tortfeasor only cost of repairs).
19. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 47 So.2d 133
(La. App. 1950) (insurer paid whole claim including deductible portion, and could
recover entire payment from tortfeasor) ; Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 30 So.2d
142 (La. App. 1947) (recovery of amount paid). See Home Ins. Co. v. AlsupBaker Motor Co., 155 So. 33 (La. App. 1934) (recovery of amount paid even
though insurer not bound to pay as policy cancelled).
20. Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Ackel, 29 So.2d 617 (La. App. 1947). See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 94 So.2d 92 (La. App. 1957).
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therefore, that the recognition of a personal cause of action is

not in harmony with the substantive law of Louisiana.
There are possible alternatives which provide protection to
the insurer and which protect the wrongdoer from double payment. For example, under the decision of Cooper v. Jennings Refining Co. 21 and other cases 22 applying the conventional subrogation article, an insurer would seem to be a conventional subrogee
23
in the following factual situations: (1) where there is a written

or oral24 subrogation given at the time of payment, and (2)
where there is a written 25 or oral2 6 subrogation agreement prior
to payment and payment for the damage the insured sustains is
made.2 T A more direct alternative for affording a remedy to the
insurer is the application of legal subrogation. 2 Common law

jurisdictions generally follow the rule that an insurance company on paying a loss is subrogated in a corresponding amount
to the insured's cause of action against the wrongdoer regardless of whether such right of substitution was stipulated in the
contract of insurance and regardless of whether there is an
agreement to subrogate. 29 The Louisiana courts have had no difficulty in finding the insurer on proper facts to be a conventional
21. 118 La. 181, 42 So. 766 (1907) (court said when Article 2160 says subrogation must be made at time of payment, it simply means that the agreement of
subrogation cannot be made after payment).
22. See notes 23-26 infra.
23. Great American Indemnity Co. v. Dixie Auto Parking and Service Corp.,
84 So.2d 233 (La. App. 1956); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liab. Assur.
Corp., 52 So.2d 311 (La. App. 1951) ; Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Fontenot, 11
So.2d 99 (La. App. 1942). A written subrogation at time of payment would seem
not to be required in any set form. See Cooper v. Jennings Refining Co., 118 La.
181, 42 So. 766 (1907) ; Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Fontenot, 11 So.2d 99 (La.
App. 1943).
24. Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transp. Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So.2d 228 (1957)
(parol evidence may be admitted to prove an agreement for subrogation).
25. Levy & Dieter v. Baer, 19 La. Ann. 468 (1867). A written agreement for
subrogation upon payment would cover the usual situation of a provision being
stipulated in the policy for subrogation on payment. For example, "In the event
of any payment under this policy, the company . . . shall be subrogated to all the
insured's rights of recovery therefor and the insured shall execute all papers required and shall do everything that may be necessary to secure such rights."
APPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 335 (1938).

Accord, Motors See.

Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 17 So.2d 316 (La. App. 1944) ; Union Indemnity Co. v.
Crow, 127 So. 35 (La. App. 1930) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Muller, 119 So. 764
(La. App. 1929).
26. A. Baldwin & Co. v. Le Long, 143 So. 723 (La. App. 1932). See ForcumJames Co. v. Duke Transp. Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So.2d 228 (1957); Cooper v.
Jennings Refining Co., 118 La. 181, 47 So. 766 (1907).
27. Payment must be made for the subrogation to be effective. See Union
Indemnity Co. v. Crow, 127 So. 35 (La. App. 1930) (payment was not alleged
nor proved by purported subrogee).
28. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2161(3) (1870), quoted in note 6 supra.
29. 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4051 (1942) ; 13 HUDDY,
AUTOMOBILE LAW § 197 (1931) ; Comment, 5 ALA. L. REV. 276, 277 (1953).
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subrogee ;s consequently, if an insurance case happens to satisfy
the requirements of the legal subrogation article, there appears
no reason why the courts should refuse to recognize a legal subrogation.3 1 Article 2161(3), dealing with legal subrogation, has
34
32
been applied to solidary obligors, endorsers," and sureties.
The surety in Louisiana upon paying the loss is allowed a right
of legal subrogation.8 5 Policies protecting the insured against
the loss of his property or legal liability are contracts of indemnity,3 61 consequently the insurer paying a loss sustained by its
37
insured is, broadly speaking, in the same position as a surety
with the tortfeasor as the principal debtor. Several insurance
cases have apparently proceeded on the theory that an insurance
company has a right of legal subrogation under Article 2161 (3)
arising upon payment of the claim to the insured. 88 Indeed a
recent decision 39 by the First Circuit Court of Appeal suggests
that a third person who pays another's debt, although in no way
concerned, has a simple cause of action against the debtor-tort40
feasor for reimbursement.
30. See notes 23-26 supra.
31. See Comment, 25 TUL. L. REV. 358, 366 (1951).
32. Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933).
33. Hart v. Polizotto, 171 La. 493, 131 So. 574 (1930).
34. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Murphy, 163 So. 724 (La. App.
1935) ; Succession of Dinkgrave, 31 La. Ann. 703 (1879) ; New England & Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Randall, 42 La. Ann. 260 (1890).
35. See note 34 supra.
36. VANCE, INSURANCE § 134 (3d ed. 1951) (subrogation only applies to indemnity insurance, not life, health or accident insurance).
37. Id. at 788: "[T]he law of insurance is but a wide extension of the general
doctrine of suretyship." 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 521 (1942) :
"If a loss is occasioned by a third person's wrongful act, the insurer occupies the
position of a surety, and the tort-feasor that of the principal debtor."
38. Hanton v. New Orleans & C.R. Light & Power Co., 124 La. 562, 50 So.
544 (1909) (court said the wrongful act was indivisible and gave rise to but one
cause of action) ; Monteleone v. Royal Ins. Co. of Liverpool & London, 47 La.
Ann. 1563 (1895). See, generally, Moncrieff v. Lacobie, 89 So.2d 471 (La. App.
1956) (dictum); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 52 So.2d
311 (La. App. 1951) (subrogation discussed at length) ; Dupuy v. Graeme Spring
& Brake Service, 19 So.2d 657 (La. App. 1944) (dictum). Contra, D. R. Carroll
& Co. v. New Orleans, J. & G.N. R.R., 26 La. Ann. 447 (1874) (dissent urges
legal subrogation). In London, Guarantee & Accident Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg S. &
P. R.R., 153 La. 287, 95 So. 771 (1923), the case originating the doctrine applied
in the instant case, the court said they had no occasion to consider legal subrogation 'because of a cause of action found under Article 2315.
39. Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So.2d 435
(La. App. 1957) (where, in absence of conventional subrogation, a car company
paid for repairs of a car in their care damaged by negligence of defendant's insured, and brought suit for and was allowed reimbursement based on Article
2314).
40. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2134 (1870) : "The obligation may even be discharged
by a third person no way concerned in it, provided . . . that, if he act in his
own name, he be not subrogated to the rights of the creditor." It is suggested that
the case of Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So.2d
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Once conventional or legal subrogation is found, the effect of
a release given by the insured to the tortfeasor varies according
to the factual situations: (1) when a release is given after dam-

age but before payment, the insured cannot then recover against
the insurer because the release has destroyed the insurer's potential right of subrogation, 41 and (2) a release given after damage
and after payment by the insurer will be effective in destroying
the subrogation rights of the insurance company only if the

wrongdoer does not know of the insurance payments. 42 Since
under subrogation the subrogee steps into the shoes of the subrogor, a general release which destroys the rights of the subrogor
leaves no claim for the subrogee-insurance company to enforce. 48
Subrogation, however, provides an equitable remedy where the

insurer's cause of action is destroyed by release and it has in
ignorance of the release paid the claim. The insurance com435 (La. App. 1957), discussed note 39 supra, might serve as a guide for allowing
the insurer reimbursement if D. R. Carroll & Co. v. New Orleans, J. & G.N. R.R.,
26 La. Ann. 447 (1874), which held no legal subrogation in insurance, is reaffirmed. Under this theory a third person who does not have a direct civil interest
in extinguishing an obligation may pay the creditor and then acquire a simple
cause of action for reimbursement against the debtor. Thus an insurer who could
not recover by conventional or legal subrogation, but who paid, might acquire a
right to recover the payment from the person legally obligated to pay the debt.
This idea is supported by French authorities which suggest that such a result is
possible. See 2 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, PR#iCIS DE DROIT CIVIL no 324 (1925) ; 8
FENET, DISCUSSIONS 341-42 (1836) ; 7 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
na 1150, at 552 (1954).
41. Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Ackel, 29 So.2d 617 (La. App. 1947) (settlement with tortfeasor relieved him of liability). See Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1095
(1954); VANCE,

INSURANCE

786

(3d ed. 1951)

(unauthorized release of tort-

feasor discharges insurer). However, where there is settlement with and release
of the tortfeasor for the amount of loss in excess of insurance -such
as the deductible portion of the policy - the release does not affect the insurer's right of
action through subrogation against the tortfeasor. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co.
v. Harrison, 94 So.2d 92 (La. App. 1957).
42. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 94 So.2d 92 (La. App. 1957). See
Note, 23 Harv. L. Rev, 227 (1909) ; Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 697 (1957). If the wrongdoer knows that an insurer has reimbursed his insured for the loss, the release does
not defeat the insurer's right of substitution.
43. See BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1596 (1951) : "Subrogee -one who succeeds
to the rights of another by subrogation." VANCE, INSURANCE 793 (3d ed. 1951) :
"The insurer can claim to be subrogated only to such rights as inhere in the
insured at the time of the loss. Therefore, if for any reason the insured at that
time has no such right . . . [released claim against tortfeasor] . . . it is manifest
that the insurer's right to subrogation is cut off." 7 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE 6709 (1928) : "It is a well settled rule that, if an insured settles with or in

any way releases a tortfeasor from liability for a loss before payment of the loss
has been made by the insurer, the latter's right of subrogation against the tortfeasor is thereby destroyed." This authority would indicate that there should be
but one cause of action against the tortfeasor. To hold a release ineffective, as
Louisiana did in the instant case, because of a direct cause of action resting in
the insurer subjects the tortfeasor to the possibility of double liability.
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pany may then proceed against the insured on the basis of unjust
44
enrichment or fraud to recover the amount paid.
Ben R. Miller, Jr.

TORTS -

LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY TRESPASSING CATTLE

Plaintiff sued to recover for damage to his crops caused by
defendant's cattle straying from adjacent land. Plaintiff's lessor
had an agreement with defendant whereby each was to maintain
half of the fence between them.' Defendant's cattle escaped
through the half of the fence which plaintiff's lessor had agreed
to maintain, and damaged the plaintiff's crop. The district court
awarded judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal the defendant
claimed that the agreement released him from liability, that he
was not at fault, and that plaintiff had abandoned the crop
and thus suffered no damage. The court of appeal, held reversed. Though the defendant was exonerated upon the finding that the plaintiff had previously abandoned his crop and thus
suffered no pecuniary damage, the court announced that in absence of a local ordinance the burden was on the defendant to
show that he was without the slightest fault, and that he did all
that was possible to prevent damage by his cattle. The defendant
did not meet this burden and the agreement did not relieve him
of the duty to keep his cattle enclosed. Harris v. Roy, 108 So.2d
7 (La. App. 1958).
According to Article 1385 of the French Civil Code, the owner or custodian of an animal is responsible for the damage that
the animal has caused, even if the animal had strayed or run
away.2 Originally the French courts interpreted this article as
imposing a presumption of fault on the part of the animal owner,
which could be rebutted by merely showing that the owner had
used reasonable care.3 However this position has changed
44. Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Ackel, 29 So.2d 617 (La. App. 1947) (recovery
of insurance payment from insured allowed). See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v.
Harrison, 94 So.2d 92 (La. App. 1957).
1. Plaintiff's lessor failed to tell plaintiff of the agreement between himself and
defendant.
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1385 (1870) : "The owner of an animal, or he who uses
it, while he is using it, is responsible for the damage that the animal has caused,
whether the animal was in his keeping or strayed or runaway."
3. DALLOZ, ANNOTATIONS To FRENCH CIVIL CODE, art. 1385 (1959). See 2
MAZEAUD & TUNC, TRAITII THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSIBILITt CIVIL
DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 59, § 1073 (5th ed. 1958).

